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INTERNATIONAL
CARD GAME
Ar
Bank cards
have yet to get a
strong foothold
in what's probably
the biggest segment
of the retail market:
the department
store
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The issue of
bank credit card
regulation is yet
to be solved.
Federal Reserve Board
member Andrew Brimmer
says the cards
may one day be
regulated to prevent
monopolistic
practices.
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The alleged imminence
of the Checkless Society
had many people bewildered.
Elderly widows were
writing to local
newspaper columnists,
inquiring how they
could live once banks
stopped issuing checks.
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accounts for an estimated 5% of net income) and was
winning some new customers.

It wasn't long ago that people began talking excitedly
about the impending revolution in money. Currency, they
said, would go the way of greenbacks and wampum;
most cash and check transactions would be replaced by
electronic, computerized blips. They proclaimed us on
the verge of the "Checkless, Cashless Society."
More recently, however, bankers and systems experts*
have amended the prediction, calling it instead the "/esscheck, /ess-cash society"; drastic changes in the financial system, it now appears, are apt to come about more
gradually than had previously been predicted.

The Beginning
Bank credit cards had actually been in use to a limited
extent for some time. Back in the early Fifties, starting in
1951 with the Franklin National Bank in Franklin Square,
Long Island, more than 100 banks (primarily small, local
institutions) entered the field. But the costs of processing a necessarily limited number of accounts in that precomputer era were too high. Few found the new business
lucrative, and most dropped out altogether. By 1955
there were fewer than half a million cardholders; purchases amounted to less than $100 million.

Indeed, the Federal Reserve Board reports that the
percentage of cash transactions in this country has declined, while the accelerated pace of check-usage has
yet to be slowed. (Check volume is expected to double
in the next decade.)

The industry lost interest, and it wasn't until later in
the decade that big banks entered the picture. But then,
too, the results were disappointing. The First National
Bank and Northwestern National Bank, both of Minneapolis, and New York's Chase Manhattan failed totally
in their efforts. The Twin City banks and Chase dropped
or sold their operations in 1960 and 1962 respectively, in
the wake of rumors of enormous charge card losses.
Bank of America, Georgia's Citizens & Southern, and
New York's Marine Midland Trust were willing to subsidize their budding service.

One reason for the decline, of course, is that more and
more consumers (an estimated 50%) are purchasing on
credit, putting to use any one of perhaps as many as a
dozen of their shiny new plastic credit cards. This year,
more than $2 billion in retail sales will be charged to
bank credit cards alone, up from $500 million only five
years ago.
Thus the impending revolution in money has, for the
time being, become a credit card revolution. Some bankers viewed credit cards as a first step toward a total
electronic money system: An opportunity to develop the
necessary lines of credit between bankers, merchants
and consumers. Besides, at about this time, 1965, Bank
of America was finding it a profitable operation (it now

1965. Enter the "third generation" computers. They
drastically reduced the costs of operating a bank card
system and radically increased its capacity to handle
accounts. In 1965, the industry showed some real growth.
A number of major banks entered the field (including two
in Pittsburgh, Mellon National and Pittsburgh National,
and Valley National of Phoenix), and the following year
four San Francisco-based banks banded together to
compete with the thriving BankAmericard. It was the
start of the second major national bank card—Master
Charge. The new organization, the California Bankcard

* Touche Ross & Co. started work on a System for Automatic
Value Exchange (called SAVE) back in 1962 and presented the
concept for long-range consideration at the Bank Presidents'
Conference, January 31,1966.
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But the bankers were not deterred. Most banks either
hurried to sign up with B of A or got out their own cards
in self-defense. Many began banding together into regional organizations to give their local or statewide
cards broader range and to share the costs of entering
the field. In 1968 the California Bankcard Assn. joined
with five other state-wide organizations to form Western
States Bankcard Assn., thus spreading the Master
Charge name and expanding its charge privileges. (Similar groups were also formed in the East, South and
Southwest and New England. Some obtained Master
Charge licenses from WSBA.)

Assn., adopted the "Master Charge" label for its cards,
and by 1967, more than 70 banks had joined. The B of A
retaliated with its nationwide franchising campaign—
and the credit card race was on.
Fraud on Credit
The going was rough at first; start-up costs were frequently higher than expected. The biggest hurdle in
establishing a new credit card was to get it quickly and
widely distributed; retailers were reluctant to sign up
with a program unless there were enough cardholders
to increase sales. Consequently, a number of banks
launched their plans with mass—and frequently indiscriminate—mailings of credit cards. In some cases there
were tremendous credit and fraud losses.

The Lineup
By the end of 1966, BankAmericard was fast gaining
the reach of a nationwide credit card—a major selling
point in the mad scramble for potential cardholders and
merchants. Non-BankAmericard banks responded to the
challenge with the Interbank Card Assn. Set up in November 1966, the Association serves as a clearing house,
interchanging the charge privileges of its members. It
in effect transformed all of its card-issuing, member organizations—local, state and regional—into nationwide
charge accounts. With six million cardholders, 131,000
merchants after its first year in operation, Interbank has
since mushroomed to more than three times that size—
at last count in June of this year, over 20 million cardholders, 400,000 merchants in 49 states. An Interbank
card (identifiable by the encircled " i " on the front of a
bank credit card) may also be used in 44 countries
abroad. Master Charge has become the most widelyheld Interbank card; this year, the Association acquired
the franchise from WSBA.

In 1966, a group of Chicago banks, eager to get a
jump on BankAmericard, inundated the city with five million cards— just in time for the Christmas shopping rush.
Although bank officials claimed the mailing lists had
been properly screened, the press was full of stories
which indicated otherwise: The cardholder who turned
out to be a child of two; the card that was sent to a longdeceased grandmother. One Chicagoan reportedly was
mailed 14 cards from four different banks—one of which
had been sent to an address he had left ten years before.
Now fraud became a major problem, and some of the
banks suffered huge losses—accounting for as much as
5% of billings. Three of the banks recalled all their cards,
pared their mailing lists and sent out new cards by registered mail.
The* incident focussed attention on the obvious problems facing bank card operations and prompted a flurry
of activity. Representative Wright Patman, Chairman of
the House Committee on Banking and Currency, introduced a bill to ban unsolicited cards and to limit the
amount that could be charged to any card. Senator
William Proxmire of the Senate Banking Committee and
Representative Joseph Karth introduced bills with similar intent. Some of the savings-and-loan people jumped
on the bandwagon, chiding the banking industry for its
indiscretions. The Talman Federal Savings & Loan Association took out a two-page advertisement in the Chicago newspapers as a "public service to all thrifty
people" to explain "how to use bank charge cards." It
warned of "the harm it could do to young, struggling
families," unaware of a charge plan's interest rates (frequently 11/2% per month; 18% for the entire year).

Now, BankAmericard and Interbank are about equal
in size. By year's end, both will have an estimated total
of 50 million cardholders, charging an estimated $2 billion worth of goods and services. But though these are
way beyond the originally projected figures, the two systems are leaving nothing to chance. Both will be carrying
on extensive advertising campaigns in the coming
months: Interbank is preparing its first national broadcasting program this winter at a cost of $1.2 million;
BankAmericard will present Herb Alpert and his band
in an October television special.
Roses from the Fed
The success of the bank cards is due at least as much
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was based upon 1967 statistics, found the cards had had
no discernible adverse effect upon the general welfare
of the economy—upon prices, buying habits, or the inflationary trend. Any future impact, the study concluded,
would be felt only gradually.

to the Federal Reserve Board as it is to the impetus of
the B of A. In 1967 the Fed urged Congress to await a
Board study before considering passage of the proposed
restrictive legislation. The following year the Board
issued a report that found credit cards a "natural extension" of banking and that regulatory legislation was
neither necessary nor desirable. Bankers were urged to
screen their mailing lists more carefully, but the report
concluded that mass mailings of cards "seems to be"
the best way of getting into the business. It was noted
that many banks had, after the major problems that occurred in Chicago, developed sound card programs by
conducting extensive market research—or "feasibility"
—studies "to uncover problems and determine profit
potential."

Courting the Consumer
Whether the bank cards will eventually drive out the
travel and entertainment cards—American Express,
Diners' Club and Carte Blanche—is another matter. As
the two dominant bank card systems continue expanding their charge privileges (particularly into the standard
cards' traditional marketplace, hotels, restaurants and
travel) they seem to pose an ever greater threat to the
commercial card companies. However, all three companies are fighting back vigorously, expanding their services and extending more credit. Diners' Club has gone
into a broad range of travel services through its Fugazy
Travel Bureau acquisition, the third largest travel organization in the world. American Express is hedging its bet
with its Fund American Companies acquisition. Fund
American (formerly Firemen's Fund Insurance) is parent
company for the sixth largest insurance group in the
country.

Indeed, reports of fraud and general mismanagement
of bank card operations have declined sharply. To ensure themselves a profit-making venture, many banks
have engaged management consultants—first to determine market potential and then to plan and install the
systems, procedures and marketing campaigns that are
necessary to implement an entire bank card program.
And some banks that left the credit card business have
returned—Chase Manhattan, for instance, bought back
Unicard last year for a reported $50 million after having
sold it in 1962 for $9 million.

Thus, the outcome of the credit card war is by no
means certain. But whatever the result, one thing is
assured: With five giant forces competing for his favors,
the American consumer cannot lose.

The impact these cards will have upon the economy is
not yet known. The 1968 Federal Reserve report, which
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early days of bank cards in this country.
In Mexico, a defensive move against the B of A in 1966
led Banco Nacional de Mexico—that country's biggest
bank—to plunge into the card business on its own. Now
the operation—Banc-O-Matico—has 120,000 cardholders and 12,000 merchants to its credit, but the bank is
thinking about an eventual merger with a new, rival card,
Carnet.

Now, bank cards are fast becoming an international
phenomenon as well—as common a sight as TV, CocaCola or a transistor radio.
Foreign banks started getting into the bank card business in the mid-Sixties, and again the B of A was a motivating force. Some foreign bankers, fearful of losing
their independence, have declined BankAmericard licenses and opted for cards of their own, instead. So far,
dozens have entered the field, in Europe, Asia, Africa
and Latin America.
The bankers are not going it alone entirely, however.
Nearly every foreign card is interchangeable with one
of the two American giants—Interbank or BankAmericard. And several are relying upon American advice to
steer them clear of the pitfalls experienced back in the

In the following interview, Ronald Coleman, a partner
of the Touche Ross Mexico City office, discusses with
TEMPO'S Janet Smith the growth of bank credit cards in
Mexico. The firm was engaged by a group of five Mexico
City banks to study the feasibility of a new Mexican bank
credit card. Mr. Coleman prepared the entensive study
and then helped implement the proposed system. A central processing and service organization, Promocion y
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that the natural conservatism of bankers also dictates
a cautious approach to marketing this new service.
There are also other problems you'd have in any developing country. For instance, if you're going to expand
your market, you're going to be sending cards out to
people with less money to spend, who have less experience in terms of controlling their own finances. That
means you've got to extend your controls—lower your
purchase limits and increase security measures. And in
order to do that, you've got to put in a better communications system. Which means you've got to have more
dependable telephone lines—the merchant has to have
some way to communicate all this data to the bank. You
also need a good centralized credit bureau so that if a
cardholder doesn't make his card payments, he knows
he'll have to live with it, because the information will be
going into a credit bureau some place. You need all
these things if you're going to expand your system to
the middle class, and you've got to expand it to the middle class if you're going to achieve high volume and,
hence, profits.

Operacion, was formed to operate the new card, Carnet
(now more than ten banks strong), just launched on
August 22nd of this year.
Mexican bank cards got a later start. Were they able to
benefit from U. S. experience?
The Mexican banking community has by and large
duplicated the pattern of development that occurred in
the States. That is, in 1967 Banco Nacional entered the
market, developed their own systems and policies, and
as a result had to make a series of rather expensive
changes as they became more knowledgeable about the
business. Then some of the smaller banks felt 'that for
defensive reasons they had to get together and go into a
competing credit card system, and they called on management consultants for assistance. The same thing
happened in the States. American bankers didn't begin
calling on outsiders for help until they saw the problems
encountered by the earlier entries.
Fraud was the major problem here in the States. Is that
the main problem down there right now?
No. But we expect it's going to be. Right now the criminal element has not yet realized that a credit card is
near-cash. Also, Mexican bankers are not going to mass
mail their cards, at least initially, and this was a major
cause of the fraud problem in the States. In addition, the
Mexican banking authorities have placed certain restrictions on the source and amount of bank funds which can
be used to support credit card charges. This means that
the number of cards which can be issued, particularly
for the smaller banks, will be restricted and hence more
stringent controls can be employed.

It doesn't sound as if the Mexican credit card business is
too profitable.
Relatively speaking, the bank card systems in Mexico
could be a much bigger profit generator than they have
been in the U. S. The cost of people is 30% of what it is
in the U. S., the cost of goods and services is as high, and
the merchant discount rate is 2 to 3 times as high (the
cost of money in Mexico runs almost double the cost in
the States). Banc-O-Matico will probably break even
their third or fourth year out, and that's about on a par
with U. S. bank cards.

Then the real problem is a limited market?
Yes—that's the major problem in terms of profitability.
The banks—because of the limits on credit extension—
restrict the cards to their prime customers—those with
an income of $400 a month or more. There are only about
350,000 people in Mexico with this kind of income, and
only 250,000 will probably end up using a credit card.
So everybody [the B of A finally obtained a licensee in
Mexico this year] is sending cards out to these same
250,000 people, and they're just cutting up the market
smaller and smaller. The number of cards that the economy can actually support is much higher than the
amount that are presently being distributed. I might add

What can management consultants do to improve this
record?
We feel we've made a substantial contribution to the
efficient implementation and operation of our client's
system. We estimate that our operating expenses will
be 75%-80% of that of our major competitors. We will
be using our computer IV2 to 2 hours per day versus
3 to 4 hours for a competing bank card system. Our internal controls should enable us to detect occurrences of
fraud and bad debts more quickly; one of our competitors does merchant discount calculations by hand, with
no later verification either by computer or by internal
office personnel. There's no way of determining if their
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not prevented legally from working together. We said
OK, because it gave us the opportunity of getting a large
number of outlets quickly, and we didn't want to start a
discount war—nobody gains from that. It also gives us a
chance to see how the other system operates, as a basis
for merging sometime in the future.

merchant discount income is correct.
An extremely important area is merchant servicing.
We will be giving merchants immediate credit, at par
value, for their deposits, and we will charge the merchant discount to their checking account at one time
at the end of the month. It takes some of our competitors
20-30 days to give a merchant credit for his deposits,
particularly outside Mexico City. As a result, many merchants now offer a 10% discount if a customer pays in
cash instead of using a credit card; we estimate that
approximately 20% of possible sales outside of Mexico
City are lost because of poor service to the merchant.

How would a merger increase the profitability of bank
cards?
In a bank credit card operation, 80%-90% of the costs
for the first year are fixed. Each of our five banks of
varying sizes will pay for the cost of operating a bank
card system during the first year on the basis of their
asset size. So if one bank has 20% of the total assets
of all the banks, they're going to pay 20% of the operating expenses. Our operating expenses for the first
year will be approximately $1 million. Banco Nacional
is about as large itself as the total of our ten member
banks. So if they join our system, that means they are
going to pay 50% of the cost of the operation. It would
reduce their cost of operating by 50% or more. My
forecast is that two years from now there'll be two bank
credit card systems in Mexico—Banco de Comercial
[B of A] and our group, Garnet, which is affiliated with
the Interbank Card Assn.

There have been many other inefficiencies as well—
a computer was installed for one year and never used,
plastic cards and sales slips have been redesigned several times. I could go on and on.
Will the limited number of cardholders tend to heighten
competition among the banks?
No. Actually, we've signed a letter of agreement with
Banco Nacional to use their merchant outlets and
charge merchants the same discount rate. [Merchants
discount their sales slips with the bank.] In the States,
each bank has to sign up his own merchants and can't
reveal his merchant discount rate. But in Mexico, we're
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in every province by 1971, the card is already interchangeable with BankAmericard and with cards issued
by Sumitomo Bank in Japan, Banco Comercial in Mexico
and London's Barclays Bank.

Canadians have generally regarded credit cards in
much the same way they have looked upon used car
dealers—i.e., with a good deal of suspicion. Buying on
credit was as distasteful to them as it had been to a
previous generation of Americans. But last year, impressed by the success of their U. S. counterparts, four
of the six major Canadian banks—the Royal Bank, the
Toronto-Dominion Bank, la Banque Canadienne Nationale and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce—
decided to join forces to set up a new bank credit card.
While each of the four banks decided to issue its own
Chargex card and sign up its own cardholders and merchants, all share the costs of advertising, promotion and
merchant sign-ups. It was an immediate success. The
new system, called Chargex, already has about 11/2 million cardholders and is accepted by 20,000 merchants
located primarily around Toronto and Montreal.'Although the banks are confident Chargex will be in use

Why is Chargex a success? "We've been able to buy
ten years' experience from the B of A and avoid a lot of
mistakes that they made," explains Jack Allanach,
Chargex' director of PR. Another reason, says Allanach,
is that "Banks are about the closest thing you're going to
find to churches in this country. Our banks have always
been very solid, and the people have tremendous confidence in them. A private company in Quebec tried to
get into the business last year after Chargex came out,
but it failed—Canadians feel they can trust the banks in
this country, but a private finance company is open to
suspicion."
Although the Canadian bankers aren't revealing sales
or earnings figures for their year-old credit card, they're
all predicting big profits for the future.
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